We analyze thousands of trials from a substantial fraction of the nation's most populous counties as well as a smaller sample of less populous counties. Evidence from four major Civil Justice Survey data sets spanning more than a decade establishes that: (1) compensatory awards are strongly associated with punitive awards and (2) the punitive-compensatory relation has not materially changed over time. But (3) 2005 data suggest, for the first time, systematic differences between judges and juries in the punitive-compensatory relation. Despite claims that the Supreme Court's State Farm decision changed the punitivecompensatory relation, we present evidence that the 2005 shift is not attributable to the State Farm case or to other possibly relevant likely factors such as the relative flow of personal injury cases to judges and juries, inclusion of 110 small counties in the 2005 data, or changes in the 2005 data coding. The judge-jury difference more likely turns on unobserved factors driving the selection of cases for adjudication before judges and jurors.
I. Introduction
Punitive damages in general and juries' role in particular persist as flashpoints in U.S. tort reform debates. Along with normative debates about whether punitive damages should exist, empirical debates about the pattern of punitive awards, as well as their relation to the underlying compensatory award, persist. This article presents results that update and supplement prior studies on the relation between compensatory and punitive damages awards and provides new results with respect to how judges and juries award punitive damages.
After decades of dispute, it is now generally understood that the bulk of punitive damages awards have been reasonably sober, modest in size, and relatively stable over time, award punitive damages 11 ) and other critical background variables, one emerging result, in the 2005 data but not in earlier data sets, is the higher amount of punitive damage awards relative to compensatory damages awards in cases tried to juries than in bench trials.
One source of newly found judge-jury differences in the punitive-compensatory relation is the possible asymmetrical influence on judges and juries of a major Supreme Court punitive damages decision. The Court's 2003 State Farm decision 12 is important to punitive damages scholars and litigants seeking punitive damages because it demonstrates the Court's continuing sensitivity to proportionality between punitive and compensatory awards. 13 From a research design standpoint, this 2003 decision could only have influenced judge and jury decisions in the 2005 data cohort, not in the data sets that predate 2003. Two reasons suggest that judges may have been far more influenced than lay jurors by the State Farm decision. One is that judges more than lay jurors are more likely to be aware of relevant Supreme Court precedent. Another reason is that judges-and not jurors-possess professional and reputational interests in avoiding having their damage awards adjusted on appeal. Interestingly, we find that the judge-jury differences we detect cut in a direction, if any, opposite to that of a State-Farm-based explanation.
We instead attribute, largely by default, the 2005 evidence of judge-jury differences to selection effects. Systematic differences in the streams of cases that wind up in front of judges and juries assuredly explain some of the difference between judges and juries. Because the data do not permit judge-jury comparisons with identical case streams (or a more perfectly controlled research design), however, we cannot be certain how judges and jurors would have behaved had they decided identical cases. Our findings make clear that assessments of judge-jury differences in the world of punitive damages persist as something of a puzzle, require continued careful analyses, and would benefit greatly from more data and more detailed data. The findings reveal a more nuanced and complex picture of judge and jury behavior than does conventional wisdom, which typically rests precariously on unstudied assumptions.
Section II describes our data, which include state civil trial court decisions involving punitive damages from four consistent data sets spanning 1991 though 2005. Section III presents descriptive results with emphasis on the relation between compensatory and punitive damages. The strong punitive-compensatory relation persists over time and applies to juries and judges. Section IV reports regression results that largely reinforce Section III's core results. Section V considers a prime candidate for why differences between judges and juries in the punitive-compensatory relation emerged after 2003: the State Farm decision. It also discusses the influence of selection effects on our results, differential impact of legal doctrine on judges and jurors, and considers other explanations. Section VI concludes.
II. Data
The Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, a project of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), presents data gathered directly from state court clerks' offices on tort, contract, and property cases resolved by trial in fiscal year 1991-1992 and then in calendar years 1996, 2001, and 2005. The four separate data sets cover state courts of general jurisdiction in a random sample of 46 of the 75 most populous counties in the United States.
14 The 75 counties sampled include approximately 33 percent of the 1990 U.S. population; the actual 45 counties contributing data account for approximately 20 percent of the population. 15 Although the initial data set (1991) (1992) includes only jury trials, the three subsequent data sets, 1996, 2001, and 2005, include jury and bench trials, thereby allowing direct comparisons between judge and jury trials. The four data sets include all completed trials in all four years in most of the counties. Sampling in the 1992 and 1996 data sets is described in earlier publications. 16 Sampling was used in three counties in the 2001 data set, Cook County, Illinois, Philadelphia County, and Bergen County, New Jersey.
To maintain backward compatibility with the earlier Civil Justice Surveys, the 2005 survey includes 46 of the 75 most populous counties. The 2005 data set expands the prior data set, however, by adding data from 110 counties selected to represent the 3,066 smaller counties not included in the country's 75 largest counties. 17 The 2005 data include 8,872 trials of an estimated total of 27,128 in state courts in the United States in 2005, or 32.7 percent.
18 Based on the sample design, the trials from the 46 counties represent 10,813 general bench and civil trials disposed of in the nation's 75 most populous counties. 19 Trials from the 110 smaller counties represent 16,315 general civil and bench trials from outside the nation's 75 most populous counties. Similar to the prior data sets, the 2005 
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all completed trials in the studied counties. Unlike the earlier data sets, the 2005 data include a variable that reports whether punitive damages had been sought in each case. These data are the most representative sample of state court trials in the United States. With direct access to state court clerks' offices, as well as approximately 100 trained coders recording data, the information gathered does not rely on litigants or third parties to report. Self-reports, common in many commercial verdict reporters, typically overstate plaintiff win rates and award levels. 20 
III. Civil Trials and Punitive Damages
Civil complaints that ripen into trials on the merits remain rare events. 21 Within the small subset of cases that reach a final verdict at trial, those that involve punitive damages are even rarer. Table 1 , which presents descriptive information based on the 16,412 cases in our data set where the plaintiff prevailed (Panel A), shows that punitive damages were awarded in less than 5 percent of the cases (N = 732). In prior research we noted that judges and juries awarded punitive damages at "roughly similar rates" and that jury trials numerically dominated punitive damages cases. 22 The addition of the 2005 data does not materially dislodge our prior observations. As Panel A illustrates, judges and juries award punitive damages in approximately 4.8 percent and 3.4 percent of the cases, respectively. Moreover, applying any realistic rate of filed cases reaching trial, less than 1 percent of civil lawsuits filed resulted in the awarding of punitive damages to prevailing plaintiffs. As a consequence, studies of punitive damages cases-such as ours-are necessarily studies of rare events.
The total sample of punitive damages cases (Table 1 , Panel A) reveals interesting judge-jury differences that the addition of the 2005 data set enhanced. For example, between 1992 and 2001, the difference in the rate at which juries and judges awarded punitive damages was 0.92 percent. 23 For the 2005 sample (Panel B), however, the judgejury difference increased to 1.67 percent. This substantial increase in the difference in the rate at which juries and judges award punitive damages from 1992 to 2005 hints at a possibly important trend that supports seeking possible causes of increased judge-jury differences. 
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Preliminarily, note that the rate of punitive damage awards reported in Table 1 , Panel A's fourth numerical row for combined judge and jury trials (4.46 percent) does not account for whether punitive damages were sought by the plaintiff. The 2005 data (Panel B) for the first time contain information on whether punitive damages were sought by the plaintiff. Surprisingly, plaintiffs only sought punitive damages in approximately 10 percent of the trials they won. 24 Among those cases where plaintiffs requested punitive damages, the overall rate at which punitive damages were awarded (the effective punitive damages award rate) in 2005 exceeds 39 percent. 25 Thus, a comparison of the 39.2 percent effective punitive damage rate for 2005 (Panel B) and the 4.46 percent punitive damage rate for the entire data set (Panel A) illustrates the importance of knowing whether punitive damages were requested. The magnitude of the difference between the 2005 effective punitive damages award rate and the rate for the entire data set-almost a factor of 10-underscores that interpretation warrants careful attention. It also suggests that changes in judge-jury treatment of punitive damages cases in the 2005 data may be attributable to enhanced coding of punitive damages information. We explore coding differences as a possible explanation in Section V.
A. General Punitive Damages Award Patterns
Punitive damages are most likely to be authorized in tort cases as punitive damages are generally not available for pure contract claims. Since tort trials are overwhelmingly jury trials, 26 it comes as no surprise that jury trials continued to dominate (80.6 percent: 590 cases of 732 total cases, per Table 1 also makes clear that, consistent with conventional wisdom, jury trials involved higher compensatory and punitive damage awards than judge trials. 28 Nonrandom case routing ensured, however, that juries and judges decided different streams of cases. For example, as Table 2 illustrates, juries saw a higher proportion of torts than contract 24 Eisenberg et al., Decision, supra note 9. Also surprising is that in 25 of the 186 punitive damages cases in 2005 (13.4 percent) punitive damages were not initially requested. These may be cases in which statutory doubling or trebling of damages is mandated, as in some consumer actions. Alternatively, evidence of punitive damages being requested may not have been detected in some cases in which they were requested. 25 See id. A data set limitation also helps accentuate the influence of jury trials. Although the 1996, 2001, and 2005 data sets include judge and jury trials, the initial data set (1991-1992) contains only jury trials.
28
As expected, compensatory damages were awarded in almost all cases in which the plaintiff prevailed and received punitive damages. In our data set of 732 cases in which the plaintiff prevailed and received punitive damages, there are 20 instances where the compensatory award was zero. 
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cases while the opposite was true for judges. Such systematic differences in the streams of cases brought to juries and judges likely contribute to variations in how juries and judges approach punitive damages. Much of the furor over punitive damages involves cases with the largest awards (the so-called blockbuster awards 29 ). As defined by Professors Hersch and Viscusi, "blockbuster" punitive damages awards are at least $100 million. As they correctly note, juries tended to dominate these large punitive damages cases.
30 Table 1 illustrates, however, that "blockbuster" punitive damage awards are rare and occupy the high end of the punitive damage continuum. Fewer than 14 percent of the punitive damages cases involved awards that exceeded $1 million. Most punitive damages awards (86.6 percent) involved less than $1 million and more than one-half (58.3 percent) were less than $100,000. It is clear, however, that judge trials are relatively more common for the smaller punitive damages cases and jury trials more common for the larger punitive damages cases.
The different streams of cases that flow to juries and judges help explain differences in various case characteristics in bench and jury trials. As noted, juries saw a disproportionate number of torts cases and judges saw a higher number of contract cases than chance would suggest. Similar variation is present in the distribution of more specific case types. For example, more than one-half (52.1 percent) of the punitive damages cases involved one of four case types (motor vehicle accident, intentional tort, fraud, and employment disputes). Of the most frequent case types, juries saw a disproportionate number of the motor vehicle accident cases. Moreover, the distribution of judge-jury punitive damages cases across states varied tremendously as well. The distribution ranged from one state (Connecticut) where judges and juries evenly split punitive damages cases, to another state, Georgia, where all 28 punitive damages cases were tried to juries.
Cases involving personal injury and motor vehicle accidents warrant special attention. Bodily injury occupies a privileged place in the popular lore of U.S. tort law. 31 Motor vehicle cases constitute a sizable percentage of torts in general and our punitive damages data set in particular. 32 As a result, we separate motor vehicle and non-motor-vehicle personal injury cases. Consistent with the overall distribution of jury and judge trials that resulted in punitive damages awards, 33 82.6 percent of the non-motor-vehicle-related bodily injury cases and 77.8 percent of the non-bodily-injury cases went to a jury. Somewhat at odds with the overall case trial mode distribution, however, is that virtually all (93.6 percent) of the motor vehicle bodily injury cases went to a jury. 29 Hersch & Viscusi, Perform, supra note 2, at 4-10, tbl.1. 30 However, there is little evidence that juries so do beyond the juries' presumably large share of high-stakes tort trials. 31 See, e.g., Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 9 (2000) ("Many people think of personal injury cases when they think of [U.S.] tort law.").
32
Of the 215 punitive damages cases that involved personal injury, 73 (34.0 percent) involved motor vehicle accidents. 33 As Table 1 shows, of the 732 cases that involved punitive damages awards, 80.6 percent went to a jury and 19.4 percent went to a judge.
The Enduring Relation Between Compensatory and Punitive Damages
One key line of inquiry focuses on the relation between compensatory and punitive damages. Figures 1, 2, and 3 permit visual inspection of both jury and bench trials over the four data cohorts. The three scatterplots reveal a robust and consistent pattern over time across both trial modes in the ratio of logged punitive and compensatory damages.
Figures 1 and 2 present scatterplots of punitive (log) and compensatory damages (log) with individual bench and jury trials from all four data sets separately identified with "J" and "B," respectively. We use logarithmic scales because, as is typical with award amounts, linear scales fail to reveal the relation between the variables. 34 Both figures also include best-fitting regression lines for jury and bench trials. 35 Notably, the two regression lines that describe the relation between compensatory and punitive damages awards are 34 Equally important is that untransformed punitive and compensatory award damages are not normally distributed, do not possess a linear relation, and, therefore, violate standard regression assumptions. For a discussion of the need to transform award damages into logarithmic scales, and of the need for such transformations to satisfy basic regression assumptions, see generally Eisenberg & Wells, Association, supra note 2. 35 Simple regression models of punitive damages (log) as the dependent variable and compensatory damages (log) as the independent variable, run separately for judge and bench trials and using weighted data, yield the following results. The 2005 data set expands the three prior data sets by adding data from 110 counties selected to represent the 3,066 smaller counties not included in the country's 75 largest counties. 37 To preserve continuity with the three prior data sets, Figure 2 reproduces 
The Punitive-Compensatory Ratio
Further insight into the relation between punitive and compensatory damages emerges by computing a punitive-compensatory ratio for each punitive damages case. Our punitivecompensatory damage award level (log) ratio was constructed by dividing a case's punitive award (log) by its compensatory award (log). Commentators describe such a ratio as a 
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"widely cited barometer of whether a punitive damages award is out of line." 38 More importantly, the Supreme Court considered such a ratio in its important review of punitive damages in light of due process protections.
39 Table 3 summarizes various punitive-compensatory damage ratios by trial mode to facilitate comparisons. Means and median ratios for jury and bench trials do not differ significantly. Although the standard deviations do differ, a test of the entire distribution precludes the rejection of the hypothesis that they are the same (p = 0.205). 40 Although bench trial untransformed median ratios exceed those of jury trials, they do not significantly differ. 41 Power calculations suggest that sample size is not a likely explanation for the overall absence of statistically significant differences between bench and jury trial ratios.
Figure 4 presents kernel density estimates 42 of the distributions of the punitivecompensatory damages award levels over time for jury and bench trials. Although the overall visual impression is one of congruence, the distributions of the jury and bench trials also include some differences in their respective shapes. Notably, the jury trial distribution evidences slightly more "spread" than the bench trial distribution. Differences between jury and bench trial distributions, however, do not achieve statistical significance. 38 See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, Perform, supra note 2, at 9. Although Hersch and Viscusi report that juries award punitive damages more frequently than judges, they do not question the very strong relation between punitive and compensatory awards in the mass of cases. They do so only for what they call "blockbuster" awards and even their data show a significant relation between punitive and compensatory awards. See 
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Award Ratios Over Time and Across Trial Modes
Figure 5 presents another perspective on the punitive-compensatory ratio and reinforces the pattern suggested in Figure 4 . The box plots in Figure 5 convey stability in the dispersion of the punitive-compensatory damages ratio that is robust to time and trial mode. Setting aside the incoherent distribution of the outlier ratios, separation between the 25th and 75th percentiles (the lower and upper borders of the boxes) implies relatively small levels of variation. Aside from 1996 bench trials, separation between the 25th and 75th percentiles appears to have settled into a relatively consistent pattern. The most striking finding in Figure 5 , however, is the stability in the median ratios. The line dissecting each box denotes the median ratio. These lines consistently hover at or just below 1.0. This descriptive consistency illustrates similarity between judges and juries as well as stability over time.
Judge-Jury Comparisons
Past research noted judge-jury differences in discrete areas and attributed the likely cause to different streams of cases routed to judges and juries. 43 To assess possible judge-jury differences we again begin with scatterplots of punitive (log) and compensatory damages (log) with individual bench and jury trials separately identified. 
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IV. Punitive Damages Models
Our descriptive results imply a robust and persistent relation between compensatory and punitive awards damages. Evidence of differences in how judges and jurors behave with respect to the punitive-compensatory relation emerges in the 2005 cases. This section explores whether these findings survive in regression models that simultaneously account for more than one factor. Tables 4 and 5 report results from two distinct though related models. Taken together, the tables provide strong support for the argument that the amounts of compensatory awards are associated with punitive awards as well as with the punitive-compensatory ratio. The tables also illustrate that, in the 2005 data, the punitive-compensatory ratio differs between jury and bench trials.
We analyze the 712 trials where the plaintiff won and was awarded a nonzero compensatory award. 44 Our sample is nested on two levels. Individual cases are clustered at the county level and the counties are embedded in larger geographical units, states, the laws of which vary and can influence punitive damages case outcomes. 45 Our data are thus amenable to using hierarchical or multilevel models that account for the sample structure. 46 For both Tables 4 and 5 , Column A, the most parsimonious model, includes a single independent variable-the (log) compensatory damages award. Column B adds a dummy variable 44 We excluded from our analyses the 20 cases where the plaintiff received a punitive award though no compensatory award. See supra note 28 and, for a general discussion, see Eisenberg et al., Predictability, supra note 20, at 629-30. 45 Eisenberg et al., Decision, supra note 9. 
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indicating whether the case was tried to a jury (vs. a bench trial) to assess the potential influence of trial mode. Column C includes an additional variable, an interaction term between the compensatory award and the jury trial dummy variable. 47 Both tables facilitate comparisons between all punitive damages cases (top panel; N = 712) and 2005 punitive damages cases in which the plaintiff requested punitive damages (bottom panel; N = 152). Note that by limiting coverage to 2005 cases, the bottom panel isolates a subset of the entire universe of punitive damages cases (top panel). Table 4 presents results from our models of punitive damages award levels. In all three models and in both panels, the compensatory damages coefficient achieves statistical significance. This finding comports with our prior research on earlier versions of the Civil Justice Survey data sets. 48 Also interesting is that in the full data set (top panel), neither the jury trial dummy nor the interaction variables achieve statistical significance. Thus, with 47 Although the analytic differences distinguishing Columns B and C are slight, we include the two separate models in response to earlier concerns about possible multicollinearity raised by Hersch and Viscusi (Perform, supra note 2, 33-34). As these results illustrate (similar to past results; see Eisenberg et al., Punitive, supra note 10, at 281-82 tbls. 4, 5), because it bears on the influence of the compensatory award, the inclusion of a jury trial dummy variable or an interaction variable (or both) makes little difference. respect to explaining punitive damage awards, the top panel (all cases) underscores the importance of the compensatory award rather than trial mode.
The 2005 results in Table 4 (bottom panel) reveal a complicating wrinkle-the emerging importance of trial mode. The import of the compensatory damages award remains intact as that coefficient achieves statistical significance in all three models. What changes, however, is that the jury trial (Column B) and the interaction variable (Column C) coefficients are now statistically significant. This finding suggests that, as of 2005, trial mode, along with compensatory damages awards, is associated with punitive damages 
award levels, independent of the compensatory award influence. Figure 6 confirms that the slope of the judge and jury trial lines noticeably differ. Table 5 presents results from our models of the ratio of punitive and compensatory awards. Using the punitive-compensatory award ratio as a dependent variable allows us to consider whether judges and juries systematically differ in the amount of punitive damages they award per unit of compensatory damages. Although the results in Table 5 generally comport with those in Table 4 , important differences emerge. Both tables confirm the importance of compensatory damages' influence on punitive damages. The negative sign on the compensatory damages coefficient in Table 5 suggests that the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages decreases as the level of compensatory damages increases. A lower punitive multiple is thus applied for higher compensatory awards. Tables 4 and 5 also illustrate the influence of trial mode in their lower panels (2005 cases). In both panels, however, the findings for the punitive-compensatory ratio (Table 5) are less robust than the findings for punitive damages award levels (Table 4 ). The Appendix reports results from similar though more complex models that include additional explanatory variables.
V. Discussion
Our core descriptive results in Section III persist in Section IV's regression analyses. Compensatory awards systematically influence punitive awards. We also find evidence of differences in how judges and jurors behave in the punitive damages context once we limit the sample to the 2005 cases. Beginning in 2005, juries awarded more punitive damages than judges per unit of compensatory damages. We discuss here factors that might influence the judge-jury difference. These include selection effects, the possible differential influence on judges and juries of the Supreme Court's 2003 State Farm decision, the possible difference in judge and jury results for cases involving personal injury, the 2005 data's inclusion of a variable that allows one to limit the sample to cases in which punitive damages were requested, and the 2005 data's inclusion of 110 smaller counties not included in the earlier Civil Justice Surveys.
A. Selection Effect Considerations
Our interpretation of judge-jury differences pivots on the nonrandom stream of cases decided by judges and juries. Table 1 illustrates that larger stakes cases tend to be routed to juries rather than judges for adjudication. This finding is especially true for the subset of 2005 cases (Table 1 , Panel B). Moreover, prior studies suggest that one would expect juries rather than judges to see a sample of cases more amenable to punitive damages awards. 49 Of course, if plaintiffs route cases more amenable to punitive damages awards to juries, our findings may overstate the juries' propensity to award punitive damages and preclude a confident rejection of the hypothesis that judges are more likely than juries to award punitive damages. We simply cannot tell with certainty how judges would have responded to a stream of cases similar to the stream of cases juries decided.
Conventional wisdom about the relative strengths and weaknesses of judges and juries may also influence plaintiff selection of a bench or jury trial. Plaintiffs (or, more precisely, their attorneys) may regard judges as more reliable, and therefore select bench trials in their strongest cases on the legal merits. 50 Conversely, defendants in cases prone to punitive awards might demand jury trials in an effort to exploit perceived (or real) comparative unpredictability. If so, we should observe judges awarding punitive damages at a rate that exceeds that of juries. However, perceptions that juries are more amenable to 49 See Eisenberg et al., Punitive, supra note 10, at 289. 50 Id.
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awarding punitive damages and awarding higher levels of punitive damages are widespread and persist. Indeed, until the 1996 Civil Justice Survey data were gathered and analyzed, the surprisingly robust role of judges in the punitive damages area was underappreciated. Thus, systematically seeking a reliable judge to bolster the prospect of punitive damages strikes us as unlikely. Similar to the empirical uncertainty surrounding how judges might respond to a stream of cases identical to the stream of cases decided by juries, uncertainty about whether plaintiffs and defendants are more likely to seek jury or bench trials for cases with legitimate punitive damages potential cannot be dismissed based on our data. That litigants might act strategically in their decisions about whether to seek a bench or jury trial comports with prior research. 53 and another reports a State Farm effect, though this claim is questionable because the study did not include pre-State Farm cases. 54 One might pause before embracing a case-based explanation for the change we report because similar claims were made about BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court case that first invalidated a punitive award on the constitutional ground that the punitive-compensatory ratio was excessive. 55 Empirical study of cases decided before and after BMW provided no evidence that the punitive-compensatory ratio was materially affected by that case. Nevertheless, State Farm is important to punitive damages cases as it illustrates the Court's continued sensitivity to proportionality between punitive and compensatory awards. 57 By expressly noting that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process," 58 the Court spoke directly to the level of the punitive-compensatory damages ratio. State Farm makes clear that in cases with particularly large compensatory awards, the punitive damages award should more closely hew to a one-to-one ratio.
59
Although the State Farm Court assiduously steered clear of setting any bright-line ratio for the punitive-compensatory relation, 60 many commentators inferred as much. In particular, conventional wisdom understood the State Farm decision to mean that any punitive damage award that is more than nine times larger than the underlying compensatory award is presumptively unconstitutional. 61 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, reacted against what she felt was the Court's articulation of a functional "bright-line" ratio rule. 62 Finally, the Court's growing discomfort with ratios exceeding one was confirmed in its nonconstitutional Exxon Shipping 63 decision in 2008. The Supreme Court's concerns about proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages were clearly understood by some lower courts as well. Lower courts adopted a functional understanding of State Farm similar to what conventional wisdom implied. Mindful of the Court's admonition of a "single-digit" ratio, lower courts called on to review punitive damages awards have repeatedly reduced punitive awards so that they are consistent with State Farm's perspective on the appropriate relation between punitive and compensatory awards. 64 Results presented in Table 1 may suggest that judges and juries were mindful of the Court's admonition about the punitive-compensatory ratio as the mean 57 State Farm ) is far lower. Consequently, that the State Farm decision might have impacted judges more than lay jurors should surprise few.
A second possible reason explaining the State Farm decision's uneven impact on judges and lay jurors involves judges' professional incentives. Unlike judges, most jurors are not legally trained and participate in the legal system as jurors, if at all, typically no more than once in their lives. Judges, in contrast, are classic "repeat players" who possess professional and reputation interest in not having their legal decisions reversed. Possessing more incentives to "get the law right," judges are more apt to stay current with important Supreme Court decisions, even cases like State Farm that deal with such technical nuance as the mathematical relation between punitive and compensatory awards.
To be sure, the degree to which judges fear reversal remains contested in the literature. Scholars note that in the absence of traditional economic "sticks-and-carrots," models of judicial decision making rely on the power of appellate court reversal as a way to ensure lower court compliance. 71 To the extent that appellate reversal performs "sanctioning" work on lower court judges, it follows that trial court judges would, on balance, prefer their decisions affirmed rather than reversed on appeal. As Professor Kim notes, however, the degree to which judges might fear reversal is a function of the probability that they will, in fact, be reversed. For example, although the Supreme Court reverses a majority of the cases it accepts for review, 72 the Court reviews only a minute fraction of trial and appellate court activity. 73 Similarly, the great majority of state court trials are not appealed to conclusion and those that are appealed are usually affirmed. 74 Consequently, the actual threat posed by reversal is quite low. Indeed, the few empirical studies that have addressed "fear of reversal" as a motivator for lower court judges' adherence to precedent do not supply support for the thesis. Although Kim concludes that while it is plausible that judges might dislike having their decisions reversed, it is doubtful that fear of reversal plays a significant factor. 75 Of course, even a mere distaste for reversal might supply the requisite motivation for judges in our punitive damages cases (the 2005 cohort) to be mindful of the Court's guidelines in State Farm. Such a motivation distinguishes judges and jurors.
To explore whether State Farm might have affected judges and juries differently, we focus on the changes over time in the punitive-compensatory relation. We do so separately for each adjudicator as our discussion above suggests that State Farm should have affected bench trials more than jury trials. To further explore this preliminary possible State Farm effect, we employ lowess (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) models that avoid any assumed global functional form for the relation between punitive and compensatory damages. Table 1 , is the opposite of the expected State Farm effect.
Combining the judge-jury results represented in Figures 8 and 9 suggests that the punitive-compensatory relation for juries changed more in the 2005 data from prior years than did the relation for judges. This is the opposite of what theorizing about State Farm's possible differential impact on judges and juries would forecast. The Civil Justice Survey data thus provide no evidence that State Farm is the likely explanation for the shifting relation between judges and juries that we report in Tables 4 and 5. 
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C. Possible Judge-Jury Differences in Personal Injury Cases
Prior research has suggested a judge-jury difference in the decision to award punitive damages based on whether cases involved personal injury. Judges award punitive damages at a higher rate in personal injury cases and juries award them at a higher rate in nonpersonal-injury cases. 76 If a similar difference exists with respect to the relation between punitive and compensatory damages, a change in the makeup of cases may explain the 2005 judge-jury difference. A shift in the proportion of personal injury and non-personal-injury cases flowing to juries and judges could lead to newly observed judge-jury difference in 2005. Such a difference would not be a consequence of a change in adjudicator behavior, but of the makeup of the flow of cases to the two kinds of adjudicators.
To explore this possibility, we reran all the models reported in Tables 4 and 5 with the addition of a personal injury dummy variable equal to 1 for cases in which bodily injury was claimed. The variable was not statistically significant in any of the models. In addition, the coefficients on the variables previously included in the models did not materially change. We thus found no evidence that personal injury cases, or the changing mix of cases flowing to juries and judges, explains the 2005 judge-jury difference.
D. The Effect of the 2005 Data Including a Variable Identifying Cases in Which Punitive Damages Were Sought
Another possibility is that the judge-jury difference that emerged in 2005 is attributable to the 2005 Civil Justice Survey's inclusion of a variable signaling whether punitive damages were requested. A judge-jury difference may lurk in the prior data sets but can be detected only with a punitives-requested variable such as that included in 2005. Obviously, because such a variable was not added until the 2005 data set, we are precluded from fully investigating this possibility.
However, we performed alternative analyses of the 2005 data in which the 2005 data were treated consistently with the earlier Civil Justice Surveys. We did so by not limiting the 2005 punitive damages cases to those in which punitive damages were requested. As reported above, a small subset of cases yielded punitive awards in cases in which the files inspected did not report evidence of punitives being requested. 77 We believe these cases may have involved statutory doubling or trebling of damages that were interpreted as punitive in nature. Those alternative analyses did not yield results materially different from those reported in Tables 4 and 5 
VI. Conclusion
The addition of the 2005 Civil Justice Survey data cohort to its three prior cohorts provides the most systematic and comprehensive view to date of punitive damages in state courts. Findings provide further support for the underlying relation between compensatory and punitive damages and uncover additional wrinkles about the punitive-compensatory relation. Moreover, results from the 2005 data point to a jury-trial effect. Absent other evidence of the source of new judge-jury differences, we attribute the emerging difference to selection effects resulting from litigants' strategic decisions about whether to pursue bench or jury trials. A leading possible explanation for the new difference, the expected asymmetrical influence of the Supreme Court's 2003 State Farm decision on judges and lay jurors, finds no support in our analysis. Nor do explanations based on previously reported judge-jury differences in personal injury cases involving punitive damages or on the different makeup of the 2005 sample find support. The findings reveal a more nuanced and complex picture of judicial and juror behavior in the punitive damages context than that previously reported. 79 Eisenberg et al., Decision, supra note 9. 80 See text note accompanying Tables 4 and 5 supra. 
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